2019年1月24日木曜日

In-Depth analysis of new Fallout Exploit Kit

First

Fallout Exploit Kit has been observed since August 2018. It is very popular and used in many attack campaigns. However, around the end of 2018 Fallout was no longer observed. It was a short break, he came back soon.

He came back and contained several changes.

1. HTTPS
  - Using Let's Encrypt
2. Landing Page
  - Changed code to generate code for exploitation
3. CVE-2018-8174
  - Changed shellcode
    - Using PowerShell
    - Bypass AMSI
4. CVE-2018-15982

In this article, I will look into these changes in detail.

HTTPS

Fallout began using HTTPS. This may make analysis and detection a bit more difficult. He uses Let's Encrypt.



Landing Page

JavaScript was not obfuscated in the previous landing page. Custom Base64 for generating exploitation code was easy to read and the table was written as it was.

All such processing is obfuscated in the new landing page. But you don't have to be afraid of it. Its obfuscation is very simple.

If you take out the last JavaScript and decode it, it looks something like this.

It will look like this if you clean it up.

Let's read in turn. The first line extracts necessary data from HTML. Decode this string to generate exploitation code. The second line defines the table of Custom Base64.


The next two functions are Custom Base64. This has not changed since the past.



Next Fallout is creating an embed element. Although src is encoded, it becomes a URL by decoding it. This reads the exploitation SWF of CVE-2018-15982.


Finally Fallout is creating a script element. VBScript text is the decoded version of HTML data read in line 1. This reads the exploitation code of CVE-2018-8174.


CVE-2018-8174

The code is exactly the same as PoC. shellcode has been updated.


Looking at shellcode, it contains encrypted data at the end. Run it on CreateProcessA.


Data is encrypted by RC4.


The key is hard-coded, and when you decode it using it, you get such PowerShell code.


Decoding Base64 and formatting it look like this:

The first line is a technique to Bypass Anti Malware Scan Interface. Matt Graeber tweeted in 2016.

Next, the C # code is defined. When it shapes it, it looks like this. This will define CreateProcess.


Next is the process of downloading and saving malware. Previously it was encrypted with RC4, but now it is an exe file.


Finally, run the malware by CreateProcess.


CVE-2018-15982

In this update CVE-2018-15982 has been added to Fallout.


However, this is the same as PoC. Shellcode is the original but it is the same algorithm as the one already explained in 8174.



It is slightly different only in the final PowerShell code. Instead of executing malware with CreateProcess like 8174, it is running with Invoke-Expression.


Conclusion

Fallout made an interesting update such as exploiting CVE-2018-15982, downloading and executing malware with PowerShell by bypassing Anti Malware Scan Interface. 15982 has also been exploited in other exploit kits such as Underminer. Please pay attention to them.

Sample Data
- saz
  - 8174
    - a821dda3cba7851bf0baf4bce8da04d78107be846b18bcb6d29dc92d49973ca8
  - 15982
    - 71fcea2737551627e5bd9968903f68b7cb81a75b92fa9d10c767c1b23e6084ac
- swf
  - 15982
    - e82b042f438c173ae90d056a6c52c0a822d0f263bf8abab60503b9c5c6d68a9c

2018年9月1日土曜日

Hello "Fallout Exploit Kit"

First

At the end of August 2018, we observed a new Exploit Kit. Its behavior (code generation using html) and URL pattern are similar to Nuclear Pack Exploit Kit. Therefore we named it "Fallout Exploit Kit". Fallout Exploit Kit is using CVE-2018-4878 and CVE-2018-8174. That code is distinctive and interesting.

Traffic

On the afternoon of August 29th, we met the Fallout Exploit Kit when we are crawling ad-networks using Japanese IP address.


Accessing their landing page will read the exploit code of CVE-2018-8174 consisting of large span tag and the exploit code of CVE-2018-4878 consisting of object tag.

CVE-2018-4878

The swf file read by the object tag uses CVE-2018-4878.


The swf file is very similar to PoC.


CVE-2018-8174

The large span tag is VBScript code encoded with custom Base64, it is decoded with JavaScript and executed by "ExecuteGlobal" of VBScript.




If execution fails, change window.location. The redirect destination loads the landing page again. If it fails, the dummy website will be displayed.



The decoded result is obfuscated PoC of CVE-2018-8174. The basic structure does not change.


Shellcode generation processing which is the core of this exploit code is encoded by custom Base64.


Shellcode

The shell code flow is as follows.
[Download Encoded Payload] -> [Decode Payload] -> [Execute]


stage1:
Shellcode was further encoded by xor 0x43.



In the decoded code, the following URL is hard-coded. In this case, malware download URL is "http[:]//naosecgomosec[.]gq/Elisions-Riboza-Rigwiddy-Heapstead/8275tv9/PMJqV/Begirdle.cfml?2TV5pG=hOqeWMno&OIfd64x=Shallops_Summative_1050_Parvenu".



stage2:
Shellcode used the ror13AddUpperDllnameHash32 algorithm for the API hash.
Here is a list of hashed APIs.
The download payload is encoded. Payload is encoded using xor with hard-coded key. In this case, key is "APyfhCxJ". It can be decoded with the algorithm of the following script.

Malware

The exe file executed by shellcode is "Nullsoft Installer self-extracting archive". This will run SmokeLoader and two exe files will be downloaded.


New.exe
This is a .NET binary obfuscated by Eazfuscator .NET. We read this, but we could not find the family name. Probably it is Bot. This program contained strings encrypted by RijndaelManaged.


Searching these strings, we found VK_Intel's tweet. It probably is related.


Loader.exe

It uses vbs and ps1 to create a file called "vstools.exe" and run it.


"vstools.exe" is obfuscated by ".NET Reactor". When decoding it, you can see that it is CoalaBot.


IOC

Fallout Exploit Kit


  • naosecgomosec.gq (185.243.112.198)
  • c148012f9ce59daea1abce2cfaac9c0732e86b7eb00468222b63436306c39d26

Nullsoft Installer self-extracting archive


  • 60d8c76564e9c6ca8435b8e83be9743cc7793091856d7d624eb5f899d055024a

SmokeLoader


  • killermansopitu.com (185.177.23.245)
  • 6626c19e3f0d2fa6d2a16dcda9e3907c1af6acb223d58815ff6bb8f538b698f4
  • 6625c5281a46079b5f9b20ded3426d2022a4f796f2325878bdc59d6bb9c7c36c
  • 5b5a961e9f5bc9e8adc9562caa8c6e99be456fa211d9df7df996b2a18e896d74
  • 82.196.2.225
  • 185.170.43.95

Bot (New.exe)


  • 845888758736860a37b969cadcbaa6ed8f7db601c3597ecae477331bf6b81eb4
  • karnevallizdageil.com (185.239.238.204)
  • idontlikeitwhenyoudoit.ru
  • merhabaslm.su
  • ichockealotkrug.com
  • wheniseeyourdedows.com
  • justreggitifyouknowit.ru
  • himynameisnoah.su
  • iliketopunchnoah.com

CoalaBot


  • 65f85f643efdcde095b905aabbaa40fbdae89a0209614ada8f43f1d6295f7045
  • 185.170.43.95


2018年6月23日土曜日

Analyzing Shellcode of GrandSoft's CVE-2018-8174

First

CVE-2018-8174 exploit code published in 2018-05-21.

GrandSoft Exploit Kit used to be CVE-2016-0189 before. Now, it's using CVE-2018-8174. It's almost the same as PoC, except that some obfuscation has been added. However shellcode is unique. Previously VBScript (CVE-2016-0189) code generated cryptographic keys and decoded the payload. It was changed to doing in shellcode.

Previously flow is as follows:
    Random Number Generation -> Generate key Using Random Number -> 
    Add the key to the End of URL -> Download Encrypted Malware -> 
    Decode by the key

new flow is as follows:
    Random key Generation ->  Add the key to the End of URL -> 
    Download Encrypted Malware -> Decode by the key

      in shellcode

Traffic

First let's see the recent GrandSoft traffic. The link of saz file is introduced in Kafeine's blog.
https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/05/CVE-2018-8174.html

Looking at this saz file, it looks like the following.


The flow of traffic is the same. It consists of Landing Page, Exploit and Malware. CVE-2018-8174 is used for exploit, which downloads and executes malware. Malware payload is encrypted. Therefore, the shellcode decrypts the malware using some numerical values of the URL.

CVE-2018-8174

For technical explanation of CVE-2018-8174 please refer to other articles.
https://securelist.com/root-cause-analysis-of-cve-2018-8174/85486/

Actually the code used in GrandSoft is like this.

Dead code is included, but it is basically the same as PoC. What is different is PoC with GetShellcode part. GrandSoft's GetShellcode function has been renamed to the c111111 function, and it is such a function.


Shellcode

Shellcode calls API using hash, however this hash differs from well-known one.




Shellcode Hash Algorithm is ror14AddHash32.
pseudocode is as follows:



Shellcode uses GetTickCount function to generate keys.


Decoding algorithm was not changed as of vbs.


pseudocode is as follows:


Conclusion

GrandSoft got CVE-2018-8174. This may be a bit more powerful. Shellcode is a little characteristic. Enjoy analysis of shellcode!

2018年2月12日月曜日

Analyzing GrandSoft Exploit Kit

First

I didn't know GrandSoft EK several weeks ago. Because GrandSoft EK was active around 2012~13, but I started studying web security since 2017. I thought he was the same as a lot of EKs that was not active. However, as Kafeine tweeted on January 30, they resumed their activities.


Looking at this tweet, I immediately investigated GrandSoft EK. Even if I search "GrandSoft Exploit Kit" on Google, I didn't get much info (only Kafeine's awesome blogs were found). But these were written in 2012~13 (a little old).

http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/10/neosploit-now-showing-bh-ek-20-like.html
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/09/FinallyGrandSoft.html

When you look at MISP Galaxy, you get info about it.


https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy/blob/master/clusters/exploit-kit.json#L323-L338

According to this, GrandSoft EK was active around 2012~13. It seems that it has not been observed since March 2014. This info is old. When you search on Twitter, there are records that were observed in September 2017.


After this, for the time being a blank, events of the other day occur. In January 2018, it was observed that GrandSoft EK is sending GandCrab.

https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/01/gandcrab-ransomware-distributed-by-rig-and-grandsoft-exploit-kits/
https://zerophagemalware.com/2018/02/10/grandsoft-ek-via-slots-drops-leviarcoin-miner/

Jerome and Zerophage wrote wonderful articles. Just reading these can get a lot of info about attacks. But I knew a little about what is not written in these. So, I write some of the info I got here.

Traffic Analysis

I analyze this traffic this time. Please refer my saz file if necessary.

https://traffic.moe/2018/02/09/index.html

The beginning is the ad network. When you browse legitimate websites, you reach the Gate of attack campaign (some people call this "Slots Campaign") from certain ad networks.

Please see this for "Slots Campaign".


In Slots Campaign's Gate, redirect is done by HTTP Location Header. This will reach the Landing Page of GrandSoft EK.


The Landing Page checks the user's environment. He gets the info as URL strings and sends attack codes.


GrandSoft EK only uses CVE-2016-0189. CVE-2016-0189 is frequently used in other EK. It's no longer fun itself. However, GrandSoft EK code is a little different from other EK. Let's see the GrandSoft EK code.

https://gist.github.com/anonymous/3dfd73cb212ecfe4c100bd356e429403

GrandSoft EK is mixing unnecessary code. Deleting all of them will result in a familiar code. For example, these codes are not necessary.

z9TmaQnrKIX = "Set t7BdKL = New Q6dZEWZ End Function End Function "

Dim Q0GzfxxyDx2

GrandSoft EK is different from the current code around January 30th. There was another obfuscation in the past. This is the previous code. This was a bit annoying...


https://gist.github.com/anonymous/089810f4581b86edf27827a0a4ebeff4

Well, you deobfuscate this, basically it's the same code as other EK. What is different is the process of generating a URL for downloading malware and the process of decrypting the downloaded file by it.


A value called "keyRand" is generated and becomes part of the URL. "keyRand" is also used to decrypt files. Like RIG, GrandSoft EK downloads RC4 encoded malware.


"arcnsave" is also in RIG. Such a code.


For this reason, encryption key is not hard-coded. In order to know the key, it's necessary to obtain the URL from the traffic.


Finally

GrandSoft EK is not an advanced EK. But there was a little fun feature. I want to follow up on future updates😊

2018年1月2日火曜日

Analyzing Ramnit used in Seamless campaign

First

Seamless campaign which is a Drive-by Download attack campaign uses Ramnit banking trojan. Many articles about Seamless campaign are published. For example, Cisco Umbrella, Malware-Traffic-Analysis and traffic.moe. Seamless has been using Ramnit since it began to be observed. Once run, Ramnit injects code into the web page to steal information such as credit cards. Ramnit is a previously reported banking trojan, but since I didn't know much about it, so I investigated about it.

Seamless Campaign Traffic

First, about Seamless campaign. Seamless campaign consists of the following traffic.


When reaching Seamless's Pre-Gate from the ad network, Pre-Gate gets the user's time zone information and sends it to the server. If the user belongs to the target time zone, Pre-Gate redirects the user to Gate via several redirectors. The user reads the landing page of the RIG Exploit Kit at Gate, which attacks and sends Ramnit.


Seamless is sensitive to the user's geolocation. Pre-Gate exists for each target country. For example, Pre-Gate for USA redirect to Gate for USA and Ramnit for USA is sent.

Ramnit Traffic

Ramnit uses the original protocol when communicating with C2. Following this protocol, I try to extract the configs and modules from the traffic of Ramnit and C2.

This protocol uses port 443. But, not https. A simple mechanism is on tcp. Packet consists of multiple commands and data. The structure is as follows.



magic number is a fixed value. Packets start with this bytes. length is the length of command and data. In other words, strlen(command + data). command is 1 byte. There are various kinds of this.



Data has three structures.



The encryption key of RC4 seems to be stable. In my environment `fenquyidh` is the key.

Let's look at the data using actual traffic. If you have Ramnit traffic, use it. If you do not have it, look for Ramnit and move it, or look for pcap etc. For example, if you look at the #Ramnit tag on Twitter, you will find many Tweets. You will surely get Ramnit or its traffic.

Ramnit is banking trojan. It depends on the target country/region. For example, Ramnit used in attack campaign targeting Japan doesn't work with IP addresses of countries other than Japan. The configs and modules that Ramnit acquires from C2 also change. This time, let's see the traffic of Ramnit for Japan. If you are not able to get the traffic of Ramnit for Japan, please refer to this link. It seems that someone kindly released pcap ;)

https://gist.github.com/anonymous/2d7eef0c0ffba19338afd74823d7a8c9

Let's open pcap and look at the first packet.



When parsing this according to the protocol, it becomes as follows.



This data is encoded with RC4. So I decode it. RC 4 is a simple algorithm, write the code.



The results are as follows. Ramnit is sending two MD5 values to C2. Registration is done to bot by this.

string(32) "d5ad437b032fd239616c1d0d97a6b6eb"
string(32) "e4b7a6323fab5960363d771a124b6079"

This is what automates these processes.

https://github.com/nao-sec/ramnit_traffic_parser

This script uses tshark. If not installed, please install and set environment variables. Now, let's run the script.



Files are created in the output directory. Let's look at `064_21.bin`.

This file says "Antivirus Trusted Module v2.0 (AVG, Avast, Nod32, Norton, Bitdefender)". You can see that there is MZ header below 0x120 and it is a PE file. Cutting out 0x120 or later result in the following.



It is unpacked because packed by UPX.



Looking at this DLL with IDA, you can see that it is a program that interferes with Anti-Virus software.

Several DLL modules (067_21.bin, 070_21.bin, 073_21.bin) are downloaded like this.

Next, let's see 106_15.bin. This file seems to be zip. Looking inside it was IE's cookies. There was a DLL module that zipped the cookie, so it might be related.



Finally, look at 139_13.bin. This is the config of the injecting code for the web page.



Looking at this configuration, URLs of many credit card companies and related companies exist. It was localized for Japan.

Ramnit Modules

I analyzed the modules that Ramnit downloads. All modules had data added at the beginning of the PE format.


Also, its PE file is a DLL, packed with UPX.


At the beginning of the module there is a comment like a description of the role. Most of them are similar to the information already analyzed by analysts.




For Japan

[module 1]

  • AvTrust
  • Antivirus Trusted Module v2.0 (AVG, Avast, Nod32, Norton, Bitdefender)


Add to antivirus software exception list

[module 2]

  • CookieGrabber
  • Cookie Grabber v0.2 (no mask)


Compress and send cookies of browsers (firefox, chorome, opera, IE) to zip.

[module 3]

  • Hooker
  • IE & Chrome & FF injector


[module 4]
Browser communication hook


  • VNC IFSB
  • VNC IFSB x64-x86


I think it is similar to this code.
https://github.com/gbrindisi/malware/blob/master/windows/gozi-isfb/AcDll/activdll.c

[module 5]

  • FFCH
  • FF&Chrome reinstall x64-x86 [silent]


For USA

module 1~4 is the same. module5 had the following functions instead.


  • FtpGrabber2
  • Ftp Grabber v2.0


And In US IP, AZORult has been downloaded.

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/37b66f9117a2140fa11badad967c09142860d04af9a3564bfe58527d7d7e9270

IOCs

https://github.com/nao-sec/ioc/blob/master/nao_sec/5a34bc94-1eb8-4213-9ab8-34dbc0a8010a.json

Finally

The Ramnit has not changed very much for a long time. It was consistent with Symantec's contents published in 2014.

https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/w32-ramnit-analysis-15-en.pdf

The configuration changes depending on the IP address, but the same module was downloaded.

Ramnit traffic is interesting ;)